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Continuity and Mathematical Ontology in Aristotle 
 
Keren Wilson Shatalov  
 
In this paper I argue that Aristotle’s understanding of mathematical continuity constrains the 
mathematical ontology he can consistently hold. On my reading, Aristotle can only be a 
mathematical abstractionist of a certain sort. To show this, I first present an analysis of Aristotle’s 
notion of continuity by bringing together texts from his Metaphysica and Physica, to show that 
continuity is, for Aristotle, a certain kind of per se unity, and that upon this rests his distinction 
between continuity and contiguity.  Next I argue briefly that Aristotle intends for his discussion of 
continuity to apply to pure mathematical objects such as lines and figures, as well as to extended 
bodies.  I show that this leads him to a difficulty, for it does not at first appear that the distinction 
between continuity and contiguity can be preserved for abstract mathematicals.  Finally, I present a 
solution according to which Aristotle’s understanding of continuity can only be saved if he holds a 
certain kind of mathematical ontology. 
 
 
My topic in this paper is Aristotle’s understanding of mathematical continuity.  
While the idea that continua are composed of infinitely many points is the present day 
orthodoxy, the Aristotelian understanding of continua as non-punctiform and infinitely 
divisible was the reigning theory for much of the history of western mathematics, and there 
is renewed interest in it from current mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics. 
Stewart Shapiro, Geoffrey Hellman, and Oystein Linnebo1, for example, are together 
working on a project which uses contemporary mathematical and logical tools to develop a 
mathematics of continuity which preserves the Aristotelian intuition and which is 
equivalent, at least in part, to the analysis account of continuity as punctiform.   
My project began as an examination of the disagreement between Aristotle and the 
atomists which was aimed at meditating on the merits of the Aristotelian intuition as it 
appears in Aristotle. Thus much of this paper consists in an exegesis of Aristotle’s 
 
1 Cf. “Aristotelian Continua.” Philosophia Mathematica, Volume 24, Issue 2, 1 June 2016, Pages 
214–246, and “Frege Meets Aristotle.” Philosophia Mathematica, Volume 25, Issue 1, 1 February 
2017, Pages 73–90. 





understanding of the mathematical notion of continuity. In examining Aristotle’s views 
about continuity, however, I was led to the somewhat surprising conclusion that Aristotle’s 
particular way of accounting for the non-punctiform nature of continuity cannot be 
separated from his mathematical ontology. First, I came to think that there is good reason to 
hold that Aristotle is offering an analysis of continuity, and a distinction between continuity 
and contiguity, which is intended to apply both to bodies and to abstract mathematical 
items such as straight lines. I will offer some defense of this in the body of the paper. 
Furthermore, I found that this raises an interesting puzzle, whose solution has bearing on 
what kind of mathematical ontology Aristotle can consistently offer.   
The puzzle is that Aristotle’s analysis of continuity does not at first seem to work 
equally well for both sensible bodies and abstract mathematicals. This is no surprise for a 
commentator who holds that Aristotle’s continuity applies only to physical bodies, but 
given my reasons for thinking that Aristotle had in mind also abstract mathematical items, 
if unsolved this problem seems a weakness in his account. I argue that if Aristotle accepts 
or has in mind the solution I offer him, he can only consistently hold a version of 
mathematical abstractionism which allows that mathematical objects exist in the empirical 
world in a dependent sort of way by being instantiated in bodies. I do not take this to imply 
that Aristotle is a strict literalist about mathematical ontology. Rather, I think that this 
implies that Aristotle is, or can only consistently be, a mathematical abstractionist of a 
certain kind. That is to say, if I am right about how Aristotle understands continuity, then 
this provides support for a line of interpretation of Aristotle mathematical ontology. I will 
argue that the mathematical ontologies ascribed to Aristotle by Mueller (1970) and Annas 
(1976) cannot solve the problem.  On the other hand, I argue that  Corkum (2012) and Lear 
(1982) offer readings of Aristotle’s understanding of mathematical abstraction which, while 
differing from each other in certain significant respects, are both consistent with my reading 
of Aristotle on continuity and contiguity.   
 
§1 Two kinds of continuity: [relational] and [nonrelational]continuity 
 
For Aristotle, as for anyone, contiguity is a relation. On the other hand, unlike most 
present day mathematicians, Aristotle uses the term “continuous” [συνεχές] in two ways. 





Sometimes, as for example in the first lines of Physica VI.1, he uses the term “continuous” 
in a relational sense: at 231a21-23 Aristotle says that two magnitudes2 stand in a relation of 
continuity when the extremities at which they touch are one. In the next line, by contrast, 
Aristotle indicates that it follows from this that “nothing that is continuous can be 
composed of indivisibles: e.g. a line cannot be composed of points” (231a24-25).3  Here, 
evidently, Aristotle uses the term “continuous” to refer to a property which belongs to a 
single magnitude. For a further evidence that Aristotle sometimes treats of a relation of 
being continuous, and sometimes of a property, the following texts may be consulted. At 
227a10, 227a21, 231a30, and 231b1-5, Aristotle discusses the relation of continuity. In 
fact, at 227a1 he categorizes it as a species of contiguity, a special case of touching. At 
227a13-15, and 231b11-12 and in Metaphysica V.6, on the other hand, Aristotle clearly has 
in mind a property. A present-day mathematician thinks of continuity only as a property. 
Aristotle’s ambiguous use of the term thus marks a departure from present-day usage, one 
which, I think, points toward the understanding of whole and part which is key for 
Aristotelian continuity.  
It would be too uncharitable to attribute to Aristotle the mistake of failing to notice 
the difference between properties and relations, especially since this is something to which 
Aristotle gives explicit attention in his corpus (e.g., Categoriae 7). Rather, I think that 
 
2 By “magnitude” in this paper I mean “a sized thing,” that is to say, any spatially extended item.  I 
use the term “magnitude” here in part because, as part of its inheritance from the Latin magnitudo, 
it translates τὸ μέγεθος, a term Aristotle uses when discussing mathematical objects.  Μέγεθος  has, 
in Greek, many of the same uses as “magnitude” in English or the Latin magnitudo; it means 
greatness, largeness, or size.  In the passages of interest in this paper, Aristotle uses the term to refer 
to the genus of mathematical object of which lines, figures, and solids are species (e.g. Physica 
231b21-25, Metaphysica 1077a9-14). It contrasts with ἀριθμός, or number, and in general with 
discrete or non-continuous mathematical objects. This differs somewhat from the usage of other 
ancient mathematicians, though it is consistent with a larger pattern of using μέγεθος as a name for 
mathematical objects. Compare, for example, Euclid’s use of the term in book V of Elements, 
according to which a number as well as a line counts as a μέγεθος). Thus, following Aristotle, in 
this paper I will use “magnitude” to refer to spatially extended items. A line is a magnitude, insofar 
as it is an item having some length, and a square and a cube are also magnitudes. Similarly, any 
physical body is a magnitude insofar as it has height, depth, and width. Thus the term “magnitude” 
is useful insofar as it is applicable both to pure or abstract geometrical items such as lines and to 
physical, measurable bodies. I will call abstract mathematical objects such as lines “pure 
magnitudes”, and sensible, sized bodies “sensible magnitudes”, where a distinction is called for. 
3 Unless otherwise indicated, in what follows all translations will be from the R.P. Hardie and R.K. 
Gaye  translations of Physica and Metaphysica in The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol I&II, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes, Princeton, Princeton University Press (1984). 





attending to Aristotle’s use of the term “continuous” shows that Aristotle has in mind two 
kinds of continuity: one a relation, the other a property. The difficulty for his readers is that 
both when he refers to the relation and when he discusses the non-relational property 
Aristotle appeals to the same definition of things being continuous, the one given at 
227a10-12.       
Nevertheless, however confusingly Aristotle seems to conflate these two, a 
consistent position can be pieced together. A comparison of the Physica passage with the 
discussion of unity in Aristotle’s Metaphysica, especially Metaphysica V, shows that non-
relational or holistic continuity is a kind of per se unity; all continua are per se unities.4 
Further, something is [non-relational] continuous when the boundaries of its successive 
parts not only touch but become one, i.e., when its parts are [relational] continuous with 
each other.5 This is what Aristotle has in mind when he claims at 227a13-15 that “This 
definition [the definition of continuity] makes it plain that continuity belongs to things that 
naturally in virtue of their mutual contact form a unity”.   
This description of continua might seem paradoxical. In allowing that a continuum 
results when multiple magnitudes are [relational] continuous, Aristotle seems to admit two 
inconsistent descriptions of the same case. On the one hand there seems to be only one 
magnitude, one continuum. On the other hand Aristotle allows that there are two 
magnitudes which are continuous with each other. Aristotle has in mind here what are 
sometimes awkwardly labeled “potential parts” to show that there is no contradiction 
involved in allowing that a continuum is in a way one, and in a way many.6 According to 
 
4 I do not mean to imply that the reverse is also true; not all per se unities are continua. For 
example, the divine being from the final books of Aristotle’s Physica and Metaphysica is a per se 
unity. However, being simple, Aristotle’s god is not a mathematical continuum.  Continua are per 
se unities which have parts of a certain kind. 
5 Bostock, in his (1991) “Aristotle on Continuity in Physica VI” points out these two uses of the 
term by Aristotle, and concludes as well that for Aristotle a continuum (something which is what I 
am calling [non-relational] continuous) is such that its parts are what I am calling [relational] 
continuous. However, he thinks that Aristotle only explicitly defines [relational] continuity. Further, 
he argues that the implied definition of [non-relational] continuity is problematic. I think that he 
overlooks the kind of unity which a continuum is supposed to have, and thus the kind of unity 
which [relational] continuity provides. For this reason he does not see how the definition Aristotle 
offers can apply to both kinds of continuity. 
6 Compare Aristotle’s response to Parmenides’ claim that what-is is one and continuous in Physica  
I.2.  At 185b9-10 Aristotle says of the monists that “If their One is one in the sense of continuous, it 
is many; for the continuous is divisible ad infinitum”. He goes on to say that “On this point indeed 





this special kind of parthood (this is not the only kind of parthood Aristotle allows into his 
mereology), a part of a continuum is something which is potentially a distinct object, i.e., 
something which is separable but not yet separated. Continua are per se unities which are in 
a way one (they are actually one), but which are also in a way many, since they have parts 
which are potentially distinct objects of the same kind. The multitude represented in their 
parts does not compromise the per se unity of the whole precisely because the parts are 
[relational] continuous, and this means that they are merely potential. 
This can be clarified by turning to Aristotle’s Metaphysica. In Metaphysica V 
Aristotle distinguishes several ways in which something can be one. The first two ways are 
relevant here: 
We call one (1) that which is one by accident, (2) that which is one by its own nature. <…> Of 
things that are called one in virtue of their own nature some (a) are so called because they are 
continuous, e.g., a bundle is made one by a band, and pieces of wood are made one by glue. <…> 
Those things are continuous by their own nature which are one not merely by contact; for if you put 
pieces of wood touching one another, you will not say these are one piece of wood or one body or 
one continuum of any other sort. Things, then, that are continuous in any way are called one.” 
(1016a1, 5, 7-9)7 
What is translated here at 1016a1 as something being one ‘by its own nature’ rather 
than accidentally is the Greek phrase καθ’ αὑτό, of which the Latin per se is a literal 
translation. Since it is also a more widely used expression, I will depend upon it here.  
Aristotle’s claim in this passage is that things which are continuous are, in virtue of being 
 
they were already getting into difficulties and admitted that the one was many—as if there was any 
difficulty about the same thing being both one and many, provided that these are not opposites; for 
what is one may be either potentially one or actually one” (186a1-3). Aristotle seems happy to 
allow that the same thing can be both one and many, which, I think, undermines the strict 
requirements for a continuum’s unity David Furley presents in his (1982). Furley argues that we 
cannot say, on Aristotle’s account, that the line from Trenton to New York passes through Princeton 
Junction for “[T]he mention of Princeton Junction actualizes the intermediate point and thus 
transforms continuity into contact” (Furley, pg. 24). He worries that a continuous line can no longer 
be continuous “as soon as an intermediate point is mentioned or even considered” (pg. 23) because 
it is no longer one, and argues that this fits with Aristotle’s treatment of the definitions of 
“continuous” and “touching” in Physica V, as well as his treatment of potential divisions in Physica 
VIII.8. Yet in Phys. I.2 Aristotle seems to think that no difficulty arises for the unity of a continuum 
when its parts are distinguished from each other, as long as the parts are still understood to be 
merely potential; this way, the continuum is actually one and only potentially many, and there is no 
conflict. Furley seems to make it impossible for someone to consistently think of something as 
potentially many and actually one, for even to consider a division actualizes the same.   
7  Trans. W.D. Ross, in Vol. II of The Complete Works of Aristotle. 





continuous and thus in virtue of themselves, or per se, unified wholes. Continua, that is to 
say, things which are [non-relational] continuous, are per se unities, for continuity is a way 
of being per se one. Aristotle also says in the surrounding passage from Metaphysica that 
among continuous things some are continuous by nature [τῇ φύσει] and some by art 
[τέχνῃ]; those continuous by nature are more one or unified than those which are 
continuous by art (1016a4). Though Aristotle does not explicitly claim in the Physica 
passages that [non-relational] continua are καθ’ αὑτό unities, he does claim that they are 
instances of σύμφυσις, a natural joining together, at 227a23-27. 8 I take this to mean that 
such continua are naturally one, and thus to be consistent with the Metaphysica thesis that 
they are per se unities.9  
The difference between per se unity and accidental unity is best illustrated by 
examples. Examples of accidental unities are such as piles of sand, stacks of wood, or 
handfuls of straw. Intuitively these are not really one; they are multitudes of grains of sand 
or pieces of straw, etc. In some contexts it might still be useful to think of many things 
together as being one. In this way I can refer to and think of something as “pile of straw,” 
and I can distinguish it from some other pile of straw. But what I refer to when I speak this 
way is still a stack or a heap – a bunch of independent things which happen to be put 
together. Their unity, such as it is, does not belong to them in themselves, but is a feature of 
the way I think of them and name them.   
Continuing the example, what would it take to make the pile of straw a whole? 
Binding or gluing the sticks of straw together (1015b36). Then instead of a heap of 
individual sticks of straw, there would be a single thing whose unity is not just a matter of 
proximity: the head of a broom. A sign of its unity is that the whole thing will now move 
together. Aristotle offers as an additional example of something which is continuous a 
 
8 Sylvia Berryman points out that, while Eudemus seems to have distinguished being continuous 
from being a natural joining together, a σύμφυες, Wehrli uses passages from Physica to show that 
Aristotle treats σύμφυες as a synonym of σύνεχες in the Physica discussion of continuity 
(Berryman, pg. 157-158). 
9 As further support for the claim that in Physica Aristotle views continuity as a species of unity, 
note that Furley (1982) and Berryman (2002) suggest that in Physica V.3 Aristotle introduces the 
definitions of things being in contact, in succession, contiguous, and continuous as being along a 
scale from less to more unified (Furley, pg. 24-25; Berryman, pg. 159). 





spoken or sounded syllable.10 A syllable, he says, is more than its component parts. The 
syllable “ba” has the component parts of b and a. But it is not merely b+a, for then “ba” and 
“ab” would be the same syllable. (1041b11) In the case of both the straw and the syllable, 
contact or grouping of the parts is not sufficient to produce a continuous whole. Something 
more is required to bind them or unify them. For Aristotle, this something more is not 
another element in the compound.  In the way Aristotle is thinking, the order of the parts of 
the syllable and the glue in the head of the broom are not parts in the same way as the 
letters or the straw. Nevertheless, the glue and the order of the letters are what enable the 
broomhead and syllable, respectively, to hold themselves together as one.   
The idea is that things which are [non-relational] continuous in some sense hold 
themselves together, while magnitudes which are contiguous with each other are not 
similarly responsible for their being together. There is an interesting way in which this 
comparison is exhibited by the etymology of the Greek words. The Greek word for 
contiguous is ἐχόμενον; the word for continuous is συνεχές. Both of these come from the 
same root, the verb ἔχω, which means, roughly, to have or hold in hand. ἐχόμενον is the 
passive participle. συνεχές, on the other hand, is the active participle from ἔχω with the 
prefix συν, which  means “with” or “together.” A συνεχές or continuous thing is something 
which holds together. Cornford notes the same thing in a footnote to the Greek text in the 
Loeb edition of the Physica. Comparing the Greek etymology of συνεχές to the Latin 
etymology of “continuous,” he says the following: 
Cf. continent = continuous land unparted by sea, a ‘continent’ person, one who can ‘hold himself 
together.’ In Greek and Latin the etymological implication of the phrase is more general and 
obvious than in English. (pg. 38, footnote b) 
This comes through in the Physica V&VI discussion. Aristotle begins his exposition 
of continuity at 227a9 explaining that “A thing that is in succession and touches [ἅπτηται] 
is contiguous [ἐχόμενον].” To be in succession in the relevant respect, Aristotle says, is to 
 
10 Note that in Categoriae at 4b22 Aristotle mentions language as an example of a discrete, rather 
than a continuous quantity. The apparent conflict between this and the Metaphysica passage can be 
resolved by noting that in Categoriae Aristotle argues that language is discrete by noting that the 
syllables do not have a common boundary with each other. This is consistent with the definitions of 
contiguity and continuity offered in Physica V & VI. But in the example from his Metaphysica 
Aristotle is not interested in the way in which one syllable is bound to another syllable, but rather in 
the way in which each syllable itself stands as a unity. 





be after something else such that nothing else of the same kind is between the thing and 
what precedes it (226b35). For example, next door houses on a neighborhood street are in 
succession in this way, for even though there are grassy lawns between them there are no 
houses between them. They are in succession but not contiguous. For something to touch 
[ἅπτω] another is for its boundary to be together in place with the boundary of the thing it 
touches (226b20).11 Thus next door apartments, though not next door neighboring houses, 
are contiguous, since they are in succession and their boundaries touch. 
Aristotle’s complete definition of the continuous is as follows:  
The continuous [συνεχές] is a subdivision of the contiguous [ἐχόμενον]: things are called 
continuous when the touching [ἅπτονται] limits of each become one and the same and are (as the 
word implies) contained in each other [συνέχηται]: continuity is impossible if these extremities are 
two. (227a10-13) 
Magnitudes are contiguous when their boundaries are together in place, or touch; 
they are continuous when they not only touch but their boundaries where they touch 
become one.   
Given that Aristotle presents continuity as a species of contiguity, a brief note on 
my subsequent use of the term “contiguous” in this paper is in order. In this paper I am 
concerned with these two species of the contiguous, the merely contiguous and the 
continuous. For the rest of the paper I will use the term “contiguous” to refer to the merely 
contiguous, when the boundaries of two magnitudes touch but do not become one. 
Let us return to the passage from Physica. Having claimed that something is not a 
continuum if the boundaries of the parts are two and not one, Aristotle goes on to say that 
“[T]his definition makes it plain that continuity belongs to things that naturally in virtue of 
their mutual contact form a unity. And in whatever way that which holds them together is 
 
11 Aristotle clarifies that by “together” with respect to place he means “in the same primary place” 
(226b21-22). This is a notably problematic clarification if it is taken strictly (cf. Furley’s and 
Miller’s contributions to Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought) Aristotle defines 
primary place as the innermost boundary of the containing body (212a20). Strictly speaking, points 
thus cannot be in place.  Aristotle usually seems loathe to claim that they are; e.g., at 212b24, where 
he says that “There is no necessity <…> that a point should have a place,” following which he 
argues that only moveable bodies are in place (212b29). Difficulties about Aristotle’s account of 
place are too tangled and written-over to be entered into in this paper, however. Further, if we take 
him not to be speaking strictly about place in this passage, I think that the sort of thing Aristotle is 
gesturing at when he says that boundaries are together in place is clear enough for the present 
project.   





one, so too will the whole be one, e.g. by a rivet or glue or contact or organic union” 
(227a15).   
The translation just quoted may be misleading. The idea that the parts touching each 
other (“mutual contact”) is sufficient to unify them as a continuum seems to elide the very 
distinction between the continuous and the contiguous for which Aristotle is arguing. But it 
need not. When at 227a9 Aristotle defines a contiguous magnitude as one which “touches” 
another, the word which “touches” translates is ἅπτηται from ἅπτω (‘to touch’). The word 
which Hardie & Gaye translate as ‘mutual contact’ in 227a15 is σύναψις, from ἅπτω with 
the prefix συν. While literally a σύναψις is a touching-together, or a mutual contact, the 
verb συνάπτω, from which the noun is derived, usually means something a bit stronger. The 
Liddell and Scott lexicon offers as its first meaning “to join together,” or “to bind”. The 
parts do not form a continuum merely by touching or being contiguous. Instead, it is by the 
joining or binding of what was before merely contiguous that a continuum arises. The use 
of the stronger word, σύναψις, helps to capture the thought that there is a continuum only 
when the boundaries of the parts do not merely touch but become one in such a way that the 
magnitudes together form a unity. 
The consideration of continua as per se unities prepares the way for the idea of 
potential parts. The expression “potential parts” is somewhat misleading, though as it has 
been used in the context of this and related issues, I make use of it again here. The slogan 
for potential parts is straightforward enough: “things that are thus actually two are never 
actually one” (1039a3). But something can be actually one and potentially two (cf. Physica 
I.2 186a1-3). This is the case for continua. Continua have parts by having in them items 
whose parthood consists in their possibly being distinct and separated items. For example, a 
line 10 centimeters in length has parts in the sense that it is possible for it to be dissolved 
into two lines, each 5 centimeters long. A pie has a part in the sense that possibly a distinct 
item, a slice, could be separated from it. The pie and the line are each actually one, but 
potentially many. The parts of continua such as the line and the pie are parts by being 
separable, not separated. Thus on Aristotle’s understanding, the parthood relation which the 
parts of continua have must be understood modally. 
An argument that continua such as are proposed in Physica V &VI can only have 
parts in this modal kind of parthood can be developed by analogy with an argument 





Aristotle offers in 1039a3-10. There he argues that if the parts of substances are also 
substances, then those parts can exist only potentially. Replacing “substances” with 
“continua”, I think we can see why the parts of Aristotelian continua cannot be contiguous 
with each other. The argument is as follows. Heaps or piles of things are actually, in virtue 
of themselves, multitudes12; it is only accidentally that they are one. But continua, 
especially things which are per se continuous (1016a4), are actually, in virtue of 
themselves, unities.  Furthermore, the parts of continua also have the property of continuity, 
since lines are non-punctiform and infinitely divisible. Thus the parts of continua are also 
per se unities. If the parts are actual then continua are both actually one and actually many. 
Thus continua must have parts only potentially.13 This sort of reasoning also helps to show 
why the parts of continua are [relational] continuous with each other. 
It must be noted that in the above argument I rely as a premise upon the claim that 
continua are infinitely divisible. I take this to follow from Aristotle’s definition of 
continuity, and to be an essential part of his understanding of it, though it is not the focus of 
my essay here. Yet David Bostock, in his “Aristotle on Continuity in Physica VI”14 argues 
that it does not follow (Space, Time, Matter, and Form, pg. 162). One reason for this is that 
Bostock takes Aristotle’s definition to be left implicit in the text in Physica VI, so that it 
must be teased out by examining what underlies the claims Aristotle makes about it. The 
definition Bostock offers on behalf of Aristotle is as follows: “a continuum is anything 
which (i) can be divided into two parts, and (ii) is such that any two parts into which it is 
divided must share a limit” (pg. 162). Apart from the emphasis on the kind of whole or 
unity that the two parts form, significant though I take this to be, Bostock’s definition is 
much the same as the definition which I found in 2271a10-13, as quoted above. Bostock 
thinks that it does not follow from this definition that the parts of continua are further 
divisible for the following reason: 
 
12 Aggregative wholes, such as piles or sets or groups of things, can have parts which bear towards 
the wholes of which they are parts a different kind of parthood relation than the parts of per se 
unities such as continua. 
13 Cf.  also the argument that the parts of living things and souls can only exist potentially, since 
living things and souls are “one and continuous by nature” (1040b5-15). 
14 “Aristotle on Continuity in Physica VI”, Space, Time, Matter, and Form: Essays on Aristotle’s 
Physica. Oxford University Press (2006): 158-188. 





Suppose we take a finite line, and suggest ‘dividing’ it into these two parts: one part is to be an end-
point of the line, and the other part is to be all the rest of the line, excluding this end-point. (Thus 
the second part is what we call a ‘half-open’ interval, containing all the points of the line except this 
one end-point,) Now we may surely assume that a finite line is a continuum, if anything is, so if 
Aristotle’s definition is correct then the two parts into which we have divided it must share a limit. 
According to one of Aristotle’s lines of thought, they do not, since he claims that a point has no 
limit. But in that case we must simply reject the definition as incorrect. (pg. 162) 
Bostock throws Aristotle a bone by suggesting that he take the point to be its own 
limit (ibid). This allows that the two “parts” of the continuum, the point and the half-open 
interval, share a limit, namely, the point itself. Since according to Aristotle the point is not 
divisible, however, Bostock argues it is consistent with the proposed definition of 
continuity that that parts of continua are not all further divisible. 
Bostock suggests that one way to rebut this rejection is to “put some restrictions on 
what is to count as a ‘division’ so that the example we have considered does not qualify.” 
(pg. 163) And indeed I wish to so object. Bostock offers as a possible Aristotelian 
restriction that “any way of dividing the line into any number of parts—finite or infinite—
must yield parts that share limits” (ibid). Yet he rejects this proposed principle as 
unreasonable in its own right.   
I do not think Aristotle needs to take on such a premise as Bostock offers him to 
avoid Bostock’s objection; he already has reason to reject Bostock’s proposed 
counterexample from his understanding of points. According to Aristotle, points are the 
extremities or boundaries of line segments. (Categoriae 5a215; cf. Euclid’s Elements, Book 
I def. 3). As boundaries or limits, they are dependent sorts of beings (Metaphysica 
XI.1060b12-19). They are always the boundaries of something else, in that they depend for 
their existence on whatever they bound. Michael White has put it this way: “Aristotle’s 
conception of points is ‘constructive’ in the sense that they are always conceived in terms 
of continuous magnitudes, rather than vice versa” (Continuous and Discrete, pg. 12).16 Fred 
Miller, similarly: “For an actually existing point necessarily presupposes the existence of 
 
15 In The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. I. 
16 Michael White. The Continuous and the Discrete: Ancient Physical Theories from a 
Contemporary Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 





extended magnitudes <...>” (“Aristotle Against the Atomists,” pg. 100).17 Thus there are no 
points which stand alone or are not the limits of lines, and, further, no lines which do not 
have points as their limits. Because of this, for Aristotle, all lines are what a modern-day 
mathematician would call closed intervals. Points, since they are boundaries, are not parts 
of lines in the same way that line segments are parts of lines, for they cannot stand alone, 
and result secondarily from the division of one line into two or more.18 19 In other words, 
because of the way Aristotle understands points as boundaries or limits, Bostock’s 
counterexample fails. Further it is thus a consequence of Aristotle’s views about points as 
limits, in conjunction with his definition of continuity, that any way of dividing a line 
yields parts that share limits, rather than a principle of division of continua which must be 
assumed. 
Thus, for Aristotle, [non-relational] continua are per se unities which have parts 
which do not overlap, and which are such that if they were actually divided they would be 
separate per se unities with the same sort of ontological status as the original line.  
Inasmuch as the potential parts share boundaries, they are like the sticks of straw which are 
bound together to form the head of the broom; they form a unity. Yet since they could stand 
on their own if their bond were to be broken, that is, if they are no longer holding together 
(συνεχής) or forming a σύμφυσις, they can be understood as standing to each other in the 
relation of continuity. This understanding of continuity is also closely related to Aristotle’s 
understanding of contiguity. A continuous whole, whether a body or a purely geometrical 
item, is an undivided per se unity which has parts only potentially. Its parts are such that 
 
17 F. D. Miller, Jr. “Aristotle Against the Atomists”, in Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and 
Medieval Thought, Ed. N. Kretzmann. Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell University Press, 1982 
18 A similar point can be made, mutatis mutandis, about lines as the boundaries of figures. 
19 Another way of seeing that line segments and points cannot be parts of lines in the same way is to 
note, as Michael White does, that “the ‘addition’ or ‘subtraction’ of points considered as limits of 
continuous parts of a continuous whole does not affect the quantity or measure of the sum of the 
measure of the parts versus the measure of the whole; that is, when we divide a continuous whole 
we gain an additional point (the potential single point of division has become two points, the 
respective limits of the two pieces), but the measure of the whole is no less than the sum of the 
measures of the parts” (The Continuous and the Discrete, pg. 13). In his book, White emphasizes 
the role of process in Aristotle’s thought about continuity; roughly, continua are infinitely divisible 
in the sense that there is some process of division which could be repeated infinitely. The lack of 
process in the generation of points from lines, or lines from figures (when one divides a figure one 
produces other figures and, incidentally, therefore also lines), underscores both their dependent 
nature and their different relation to the whole than the proper parts which they define.  





their boundaries have become one, no longer actually but only potentially distinguishing 
them; they are continuous with each other. Nevertheless, if the parts are made actual, the 
continuum being destroyed, the parts would be actually numerically distinct magnitudes, 
marked off from each other by their erstwhile shared boundary. Thus a continuum is such 
that when successive parts are actualized they bear toward each other the relation of 
contiguity. 
 
§2 The continuity of abstract and physical magnitudes 
 
In my view Aristotle means for his account of continuity and of contiguity to apply 
both to pure and to sensible magnitudes, that is, both to abstract mathematicals and to 
bodies. It might be argued against me that Aristotle only meant it to apply to sensible 
magnitudes. After all, Physica is not a mathematical treatise, and the discussion of 
continuity and contiguity itself comes as part of a long inquiry into change, which is 
directed towards understanding natural substances as changing things. However, the 
properties which Aristotle ascribes to continuous bodies or things in the Physica V passage 
are exactly the ones he makes use of to argue in the very next book of Physica that lines, in 
particular, cannot be composed of points. There he is arguing that no continuous thing can 
be composed of indivisibles, and he does so by taking lines and points as examples of 
continua and indivisibles, respectively. He seems to have in mind here abstract geometrical 
items, or pure magnitudes; elsewhere he suggests that no physical bodies contain 
mathematical lines and points (cf. Metaphysica III.1002a15-19).20 Earlier in Physica 
(Physica II.2.192b24-194a27) Aristotle distinguishes mathematical objects from physical 
objects by treating mathematical objects as abstractions. The examples he uses of 
mathematical, and not sensible, objects in that passage include line and figure. Given this, it 
seems that when Aristotle attends directly to lines, points, and figures in Physica V & VI to 
distinguish continuity and contiguity this shows that the distinction he is working out 
applies, in his mind, both to pure and sensible magnitudes.   
 
20 “But if this is admitted, that lines and points are substances more than bodies, but we do not see to 
what sort of bodies these could belong (for they cannot be in perceptible bodies), there can be no 
substance” (1002a15-19, emphasis mine). 





 Further support for this can be found by comparing Aristotle’s brief comments on 
continuity in Categoriae with his treatment of it in Physica. The properties which Aristotle 
ascribes to continuous things in the Physica passage are exactly the ones, with the 
exception of infinite divisibility, which he also explicitly ascribes to continuous quantities 
in his brief discussion of them in the Categoriae. In the treatment in Categoriae, being 
continuous serves to distinguish one of the two highest sub-genera of quantity from the 
other, qua quantity; in other words, the Categoriae remarks on continuity seems to be 
concerned with pure magnitudes rather than with sensible bodies. The primary aim in the 
Categoriae passage is to distinguish continuous from discrete quantities, rather than 
continuity from contiguity, so Aristotle’s remarks there should perhaps not be taken as 
definitive. Still, since the infinite divisibility of continua plausibly follows from their parts 
having a certain spatial relation and sharing a common boundary, then all of the same 
distinctive properties are ascribed to continua in both works. I take it that this strengthens 
the comparison between them.   
 
§3 The problem for pure magnitudes 
 
If Aristotle has in mind both pure and sensible magnitudes when he expounds his 
notion of continuity, this raises the following difficulty, one whose solution, I think, 
illustrates how pure and sensible magnitudes are related in Aristotle’s philosophy of 
mathematics. In Aristotle’s analysis, contiguous magnitudes touch at some extremity while 
the boundaries at which continuous magnitudes touch actually become one (227a10-13). As 
was said above, the latter functions as his definition of continuity. Aristotle goes on to 
claim that magnitudes can be contiguous without thereby being continuous (227a21-23). 
This seems straightforwardly true when applied to bodies. But among pure geometrical 
magnitudes it appears as though contiguous magnitudes are continuous with each other just 
in virtue of their contiguity. That is to say, it seems at first as though there can be no merely 
contiguous pure magnitudes. If the boundaries of pure magnitudes touch, they also 
coincide, as I will show. But if they coincide, it is not clear how they can be distinguished 
from each other in order to show that they have not thereby become numerically one. If 
they cannot be distinguished, then any pure magnitudes which are contiguous are also 





continuous. This would contradict Aristotle’s claim that “if there is contact, that alone does 
not imply continuity; for the extremities of things may be together without necessarily 
becoming one” (227a22-23).     
Some examples should help to clarify. Consider as examples of contiguous sensible 
magnitudes two books side by side. Setting aside the fact that their covers may no longer be 
quite smooth, so that the surfaces which bound them do not quite touch along their length, 
it seems perfectly natural to think that they are contiguous. They are in succession, one 
standing next to the other with no other books in between, and their boundaries are 
touching on one side. Further, the cover of the first book is not the same as the cover of the 
second. They are numerically distinct, and it is because the surfaces are the boundaries of 
distinct bodies that they are not one. Because the boundaries are together without becoming 
one, on Aristotle’s account the books are contiguous, but are not continuous with each 
other.  
The question is whether the boundaries of any pure geometrical magnitudes, such as 
straight lines, figures, or solids, can touch or be together in place without thereby also 
becoming one. When their boundaries touch those boundaries coincide, and it is not clear 
how coincident boundaries (points, lines, or surfaces) can be distinguished from each other. 
To see why this is especially pressing for Aristotle, note that Aristotle sometimes uses the 
term “division” [διαίρησις] or “cut” [τομή] to refer to a point. How can there be more than 
one division or cut in one place? If, as Michael White suggests (Continuous and Discrete, 
pg.12), we should take Aristotle’s use of the term σημεῖον for point, e.g. at An. Po. 76b6, to 
mean “place,” the difficulty seems worse. Surely there could not be more than one place in 
a place. If not, then it appears as though when two mathematical boundaries touch, and so 
coincide, they become one. Perhaps pure magnitudes can only be continuous, and not 
contiguous. 
Even Aristotle seems to think at times that the coincidence of boundaries is enough 
for their being one (cf. 231b4-5). According to Aristotle, points are indivisible and have no 
parts (Physica 231b1; cf. Euclid’s Elements, Book I def. 1). Since they have no parts, points 
can only touch as whole to whole, all of the one touching all of the other (231b3). They 
cannot touch part to part, or even part to whole, since they have no parts. Further, they 
cannot be in succession (237b6-7), since between any two points is a line (cf. Euclid, Book 





I, postulate 1) and any line can be divided at some point on it. This is just to say that 
whenever two points are together and touch they coincide.21 Furthermore, Aristotle argues, 
when points do coincide, they are not distinct in the way that is required for them to be 
parts of continua, since the two coinciding points are not spatially separate [τόπω 
κεχωρισμένα] (231b4-6). In other words, Aristotle’s argument against points being parts of 
lines in 231b4-5 seems to be that points cannot be parts because when they touch they 
coincide, and when they coincide they are not numerically distinct from each other because 
they are not spatially distinct. Parts of continua, he says, are distinct from each other by 
being spatially separate, as I put it above, by being potentially numerically distinct items. 
When a continuum is divided up, the separated items, its erstwhile parts, can be set end to 
end contiguously, erstwhile part outside of erstwhile part. Thus if some or all of the parts of 
some continuous line were points, one should be able to set them all side by side, touching 
each other but distinct. When points touch, however, they are not spatially distinct. If 
spatial distinctnesss is what is required for the numerical distinctness of geometrical items, 
then coinciding points are not numerically distinct. It appears as though Aristotle holds that 
when two points coincide, there is really only one point. 
This worry ramifies for the boundaries of two dimensional and three dimensional 
magnitudes. The basic thought is that the numerical distinctness of abstract geometrical 
items cannot be preserved if they coincide. Lines are contiguous when they are in 
succession and their boundaries touch, and the boundaries of lines are points. Since points 
become one when they coincide, lines become continuous when they are contiguous. By a 
similar reasoning it can be shown that contiguous two dimensional figures also form a 
continuum. The boundaries of two-dimensional figures are lines. In order for two-
dimensional figures to be contiguous without being continuous, it must be possible for 
them to touch each other, their boundaries being together in place, without their boundaries 
being one. When lines are together in place, however, they coincide and are not spatially 
distinct. Again, the analogous argument can be made, mutatis mutandis, for contiguous and 
continuous solids. 
 
21 Aristotle does seem to allow that points touch, not only in this passage but also in, for example, 
Metaphysica 1069a12.   





If boundaries' coinciding is sufficient for their becoming one it seems that pure 
magnitudes cannot be contiguous without also being continuous with each other. This 
would not only contradict Aristotle’s claim to the opposite at (227a22-23), but it also 
indicates a difficulty for Aristotle’s understanding of continuity as it might be applied by 
working geometers. Consider, for example, the kinds of diagrams relevant to Euclid’s 
Elements. For example, in proposition I.10 in Euclid’s Elements, the proof relies upon 
being able to distinguish two triangles for whom one of the sides is common. If contiguous 
figures are never merely contiguous but always thereby continuous, then Euclid’s proof in 
I.10 would not work, nor would any geometrical proof which relies upon contiguous lines, 
figures, or solids. 
If Aristotle’s analysis of continuity and contiguity for pure magnitudes is to be 
saved, there must be a way to distinguish coinciding boundaries. I argue that items such as 
points and lines can be numerically distinct as boundaries, even when they are not spatially 
distinct and so cannot be proper parts of the magnitudes they bound. As was mentioned 
before, according to Aristotle boundaries are accidental beings which depend for their 
existence upon the things which they bound. Thus points, the boundaries of lines, are 
accidental beings individuated by the lines they bound. It might seem that the way to go to 
show that two lines are contiguous rather than potential parts of a continuous whole is to 
derive the numerical distinctness of the lines from the numerical distinctness of the points 
which are their boundaries. But if boundaries are accidental beings the distinctness of the 
points follows from and depends upon the individuation of the lines which they bound. The 
numerical distinctness of the lines, or of the magnitudes more generally, is what is 
fundamental.22  
 
22 Marco Panza introduces a similar train of thought in a note, thus far unpublished, which he has 
written on Aristotelian continuity (2011, used with permission of the author). This piece was 
generously shared with me after the initial draft of this paper.  Panza, himself taking a suggestion 
from Ross’s commentary on Aristotle’s Physica, argues that while two points coinciding are “thus 
the same thing in fact” (pg. 3), they are not “one” in the sense required for continuity unless they 
cannot be functionally distinguished (ibid).  Ross puts it this way: “one thing, occupying one place, 
may be two things in the sense that it discharges two functions” (Ross, pg. 627). Ross himself 
rejects this interpretation of what Aristotle means when he says that continuity results when the 
boundaries become one. Taking up the suggestion Ross rejects, on Panza’s reading, when two lines, 
A and B, seem to share a point as a common boundary, they share the same point in the sense that 
the same location limits both lines. There is only one point, numerically. But the same point will 
also in a way be two, since it serves two functions; it serves to delimit A and also to delimit B.  





Aristotle takes up this strategy in his discussion of place in Physica IV. There is 
evidence within that discussion that Aristotle did not think that the coincidence of 
boundaries is, or is always, sufficient for the boundaries becoming one. At 211b10-14 
Aristotle allows that the innermost boundary of the containing body and the boundary of 
the contained body coincide, but he argues that they are nevertheless not the same 
(211b13). The interesting thing for the discussion of contiguity and continuity is what 
Aristotle thinks grounds the numerical distinctness of these boundaries. Aristotle says that 
despite their coincidence they are not numerically one because they are the boundaries of 
different bodies. The numerical distinctness of the boundaries follows from the numerical 
distinctness of the bodies they bound. Thus for sensible magnitudes it is straightforwardly 
clear why coincident boundaries remain distinct. I suggest that for a similar reason Aristotle 
can consistently hold that coincident boundaries of pure magnitudes can be distinct. One 
must simply clarify what, for Aristotle, could ground the numerical distinctness of pure 
magnitudes.    
In the case of sensible magnitudes the bodies can be distinguished by their physical 
characteristics. For example, one might be made of bronze while the other consists of 
water, or one body might be wooden while the other is a nail which has been nailed into the 
wood. The two bodies might be more fundamentally distinguished by being different 
compositions of form and matter. The difficulty for the discussion of geometry is that the 
sort of characteristics by which sensible magnitudes can be distinguished are abstracted 
from or, to adapt Lear’s expression23, filtered out, by considering the magnitudes only qua 
geometrical. It is not clear what else could guarantee the distinctness of the pure 
 
Because the same point is two in the sense that it serves two functions, delimiting A and delimiting 
B, the whole line A+B is actually divided and so is no longer continuous. If the point did not serve 
both functions then the line would not be actually divided, and would be one continuous line.  If one 
takes it that what points are is given by their functions as limiting lines, then points can be 
functionally distinguished because of the way they are dependent beings, that is, all it is to be a 
point is to be the limit of (or to fulfill he function of limiting) a line. Panza’s suggestion in this way 
may be consistent with my own. However, it seems consistent with Panza’s characterization of 
points that the numerical distinctness of lines is founded upon the functional distinctness of points.  
Taken this way, Panza’s suggestion is not consistent with the reading I have offered here, for I have 
argued that the numerical distinctness of points or indeed of any boundaries, depends upon the 
numerical distinctness of what they bound, rather than the reverse. 
23 Lear, Jonathan. ‘Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 91, No. 
2 (Apr., 1982), pp. 161-192. 





magnitudes. If we cannot find an independent way of distinguishing the contiguous 
magnitudes, then we will not be able to use their numerical distinctness to get the numerical 
distinctness of their coincident boundaries. If we fail in this way, then we can no longer 
suppose that the two magnitudes are contiguous; they must be continuous. But we cannot 
then allow that they are [relational] continuous, as Aristotle has suggested, for [relational] 
continuity requires that we be able to distinguish the two lines as parts, or possible parts, of 
a single, unified whole. If we cannot distinguish the two lines, and so their coincident end-
points, then we cannot consistently accept Aristotle’s understanding of the two kinds of 
continuity.  
 
§4 A solution which will not work 
 
Note that if I am correct that Aristotle intends his definitions of continuity and 
contiguity to apply to both abstract geometrical objects and to sensible magnitudes, this 
removes the possibility of White’s understanding of the difference between continuity and 
contiguity for Aristotle. According to White, there is no purely mathematical distinction 
between contiguous magnitudes and continuous magnitudes: “Rather, continuity pertains to 
what is homeomerous, while contiguity pertains to parts which are spatially joined but 
essentially different” (The Continuous and the Discrete, pg. 27). Thus according to White, 
whether or not two magnitudes are continuous or contiguous depends on their non-
mathematical properties. For example, if one of the “parts” of, say, a stretch of territory, is 
water while the other is land, the water and the land are contiguous. But if the territory 
contains no bodies of water and is all land, the parts are continuous. In Physica Aristotle 
concerns himself at times with abstract mathematical objects as I have argued, then his 
distinction between continuity and contiguity cannot be saved by appealing to sensible 
properties of sensible magnitudes in the way White suggests.  
There is, I think further reason to set aside White’s way of understanding Aristotle’s 
distinction between continuity and contiguity, though perhaps not a full disproof. White’s 
use of the term “homeomerous” is not quite in line with Aristotle’s own use of the Greek 
term [ὁμοιομερές]. White points to Physica IV.5.212b4-6, where Aristotle associates being 
homeomerous with being continuous, to support his proposal that continuity is linked to 





homeomereity (The Continuous and the Discrete, footnote 31, pg. 27). I agree that for 
Aristotle continua are homoeomerous, yet I think that White’s understanding of what this 
means for Aristotle is mistaken.  
On White’s reading the parts of continua must be homeomerous in the sense that 
they are of the same kind as each other: both water, in my example, or both land. On this 
definition the whole magnitude need not be thought of as being of that kind. It might, in my 
example, be a territory, or a farm, or something else. On White’s reading the heteromereity 
of the parts of contiguous magnitudes consists in their being different from each other. Of 
course, in this case the whole magnitude of which they are parts cannot be of either kind. 
To reiterate, for White the sameness hinted at in the term “homeomerous” is between two 
things, in his examples, two parts of the same, as is the difference implied by 
“heteromerous”. Yet in Aristotle’s use of the term “homeomerous”, it applies to wholes. 
The sameness implicated in the term is sameness of kind between the whole and its parts, 
rather than primarily between the parts. For example, in Metaphysica V Aristotle presents 
water as a homeomerous material, on the grounds that when it is divided into parts, its parts 
are also water. (1014a30-31). Aristotle uses the term ὁμοιομερῆ [“homeomerous thing”] 
this same way in Physica I.4 (187a25 and 188a13-15), when discussing Anaxagoras’s view 
of the elements. For Aristotle, something is heteromerous when its parts are of a different 
kind than the whole from which they are divided. The way White is taking the term 
“homeomerous”, an object could be heteromerous in Aristotle’s use of the term as I have 
explained it, while the parts could be homoiomerous in the way White uses the term, for the 
parts could be of the same kind as each other, but different in kind from the whole.   
If we understand homeomereity for Aristotle as consisting in the parts being of the 
same kind as the whole, then it will follow that for Aristotle continua are homeomerous. 
But their homeomereity will consist in their being of the same number of dimensions as the 
whole of which they are parts, rather than their having the same non-mathematical 
properties. This is because the proper parts of mathematical continua must be spatially 
separate, and potentially distinct mathematical objects. One can see this by realizing again 
that points are not, for Aristotle, parts of lines but termini; similarly, lines are not parts of 
figures but their boundaries. Proper parts of lines are always lines, and of figures always 
figures.   





Still, in one way White, and Berryman, who agrees with him in part about the 
relation between continuity and homeomereity24, are in agreement with the understanding 
of continuity and contiguity I have presented here. For sensible magnitudes, their 
boundaries will be coincident but not become one when the two sensible magnitudes are 
distinct bodies. For non-living bodies, this will most often be the case when the two bodies 
are of different kinds. My computer, for example, is contiguous rather than continuous with 
my wooden desk, though my desk’s wooden legs are continuous with it. The touching 
boundaries of the two sensible magnitudes, my computer and my desk, are distinct from 
each other despite their coincidence, for the bodies which they bound are distinct. On my 
view, however, we still must discover what could make pure magnitudes, Aristotle’s 
abstract mathematicals, distinct, since they do not have sensible properties which could 
distinguish them in the same way as sensible magnitudes are distinguished. 
 
§5 Complications with some proposed exegeses of Aristotle’s mathematical ontology 
 
This puzzle narrows the field of views of mathematical ontology which Aristotle 
can consistently hold. To argue this, I will not be attending directly to the complex texts of 
Physica B.2 and Metaphysica M & N, as so many capable scholars already have. It may be 
that Aristotle does hold some view of the nature of mathematical and geometrical objects 
which is inconsistent with his positing a difference between contiguity and continuity for 
geometrical objects in the way I have suggested. Perhaps all I accomplish here is pointing 
out a flaw in Aristotle’s approach to geometry and mathematical ontology. Still, there are 
detailed readings of the relevant texts on offer which impute to Aristotle a view about 
mathematical ontology which will save his understanding of continuity and contiguity. I 
suggest that Jonathan Lear in his (1982) “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Math”, and Phil 
Corkum in his (2012) “Aristotle on Mathematical Truth” offer such readings.  On the other 
hand, the view which Julia Annas presents in her (1976) introduction to the Clarendon 
series’ Aristotle’s Metaphysica Book M and N does not, and neither does Ian Mueller’s 
 
24 Berryman, Sylvia. "Continuity and Coherence in Early Peripatetic Texts," in Eudemus of Rhodes, 
ed. István Bodnár, William W. Fortenbaugh. Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 
XI,  New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers (2002): pg. 160. 





(1970) “Aristotle on Geometrical Objects” for similar reasons. This is not an exhaustive list 
of exegeses of Aristotle’s mathematical ontology. However, by focusing on these I hope to 
highlight what sort of feature is required in order to save Aristotle’s discussion of 
contiguity and continuity.   
To begin with, let me provide an example by considering what mathematical 
platonism could offer to Aristotle in the fix he is in. By “mathematical platonism” I do not 
mean Plato’s own views about mathematical ontology, at least not in all their details, but 
rather what is in common between Plato’s views and what a present day philosopher of 
mathematics would understand by the term. This is, in Julia Annas’s words,  
a type of realism, amounting to the belief that mathematical objects such as numbers literally exist, 
independent of us and our thought about them.  Numbers are not, of course, in the world around us; 
they do not exist in space and time.  But they exist none the less; they are there to be discovered 
before we think of the means of describing them. (M & N, pg. 3-4)25 
It is, of course, well-established that Aristotle did not follow his mentor’s lead by 
proposing such an ontology.Annas, for example, commenting on the tone and general intent 
of Aristotle’s remarks on philosophy of mathematics in Metaphysica M & N, says that 
“Aristotle’s attitude is best characterized as ‘anti-platonism’” (M & N, pg. 26), since the 
bulk of his treatment there is polemical against various kinds of platonism he finds in the 
Academy. Further, Aristotle seems to more generally hold, contrary to Plato, that material 
particulars are ontologically prior to the properties they possess26; it would be odd, to say 
the least, if mathematical properties were an exception to this.   
Setting this aside, however, suppose Aristotle were to be a platonist about 
mathematical objects: would this enable him to preserve the numerical difference between 
two supposedly contiguous lines? I think not. To see this, consider the problem which Julia 
 
25 Cf. Mueller (1970), pg. 156. Similarly, Mark Balaguer, in his article for the SEP entitled 
“Platonism in Metaphysica”, in its subsection on platonism in mathematics proposes that 
mathematical platonism holds that the truths of mathematics are about “about abstract objects rather 
than mental or physical objects of some kind” (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1). 
Platonism about mathematical objects, according to Oystein Linnebo, “is the Metaphysical view 
that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, 
thought, and practices” (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/). 
26There are complexities to this general characterization of Aristotle’s Metaphysical views, leading 
to well-entrenched debates regarding, for example, Aristotle’s treatment of form as substance-of-a-
substance in Metaphysica Z.   





Annas calls the “Uniqueness Problem”. Annas suggests that this problem motivates 
positing geometrical intermediates such as are thought by some to be a part of the 
“unwritten doctrines” of Plato. The Uniqueness Problem is as follows: 
A theorem mentions two circles intersecting.  What is referred to cannot be the circles drawn in the 
diagram (cf. the Euthydemus passage), for these may fail to give the needed result through careless 
drawing or the like.  But nor can it be the Form of Circle suggested (carelessly) in the Philebus, for 
that is unique. (M & N, pg. 25)27 
If there is only the Form of Line, then there cannot be two contiguous lines any 
more than there could be two contiguous circles in Annas’s example, or two of any Form. 
Contiguity, whatever it is, could therefore not belong to geometrical objects in their own 
right; it could only belong to physical bodies in their particular instantiations of the Forms.   
Even if one avoids the Uniqueness Problem, so that it is possible for there to be two 
lines, we can discover a further, related difficulty through the following sort of thought 
experiment. If we try to conceive of a line divided at a single point into two parts which 
share that point as an endpoint, there is still nothing in our simple theory of mathematical 
ontology which provides the criteria according to which the supposed contiguous lines can 
be distinguished as mathematical items. That there could be two lines in some case in 
mathematics does not help the case where the supposedly distinct lines have coincident 
endpoints; there is nothing to distinguish the two lines which comes from their properties as 
lines. Even positing that they are distinct because one is on the left-hand side and the other 
on the right-hand, for example, presumes that they are distinct to begin with so that they 
can have position relative to each other. What seems to distinguish the two lines, if 
anything, is our imagination, our way of looking at things. If this is correct, then contiguity 
as a mathematical property is in an important way mind-dependent. This, however, is not 
consistent with mathematical platonism.  
Setting aside mathematical platonism, prominent readings of Aristotle fail to solve 
the contiguity problem for similar reasons. Ian Mueller in his (1970) article offers a subtle 
view according to which Aristotle takes geometrical objects to be “substance-like 
 
27 Mueller points to a similar problem in his “Aristotle on Geometrical Objects”, pg. 163, as quoted 
on my page 16. 





individuals with a special matter – intelligible matter” (“Geometrical Objects”, pg. 164). He 
motivates his view first by proposing that there are two ways to think about abstraction: 
If abstraction is primarily thought of as eliminating properties, one will think of mathematical 
objects as physical objects looked at as if they did not have certain properties.  On the other hand, if 
one thinks of abstraction primarily as eliminating matter, one will think of mathematical objects as 
properties like roundness and triangularity. (“Geometrical Objects”, pg. 161-162) 
Mueller takes the second view; mathematical objects are in some sense universals, 
properties which are separated from matter. He does point out a problem for universals 
which is very similar to the one Annas called the Uniqueness Problem, which he 
characterizes thus: “First of all, universals do not have exactitude of the kind which 
Aristotle attributes to mathematical objects. Circularity does not touch straightness in a 
point or in any other way” (“Aristotle on Geometrical Objects”, pg. 163). Yet he proposes 
that the subtleties of Aristotle’s view enable him to avoid this, and related, difficulties. 
According to Mueller, Aristotle takes the basic mathematical properties to be 
extension in one, two, or three dimensions, or “the purely dimensional underlying other 
properties” (pg. 166). These basic properties are indefinite extension, and they are general, 
in the sense that circles and rectangles are species of plane figures, and cubes and spheres 
of solids (three-dimensional extension). Mueller relies on Alexander, the author of In 
Metaphysica, for the comment that genera are intelligible matter (pg. 167, note 34). 
According to Mueller, these most basic geometrical properties of bodies serve as 
intelligible matter for geometric properties, the differentiae of the genera, such as straight 
or curved, three-sided or two-sided. The objects which geometers study are thus complexes 
of noetic or intelligible matter, i.e., the basic mathematical properties of physical things, 
and other geometrical properties. Though Mueller does not state this explicitly, he presents 
this hylomorphic kind of composition of geometrical objects as providing them with the 
kind of particularity required for them to be fitting subjects of study for geometers. By 
being substance-like in this way, geometrical objects can be particular, and, he implies, 
have the requisite kind of exactitude. 
I think that this puts Mueller in the same position as the platonist I mentioned 
above. Mueller’s understanding of mathematical objects as being substance-like shows that 
mathematical objects such as lines and triangles are not unique (there can be more than one 





line in the cosmos, or more than one triangle, apart from the lines and figures found 
imperfectly in physical bodies), but he still has provided no resource for distinguishing our 
ersatz contiguous lines from each other. Straight and curved, for example, the differentiae 
of one-dimensional extension, do not distinguish the ersatz lines.Nor can we distinguish 
them by the ratio of their lengths without circularly assuming that they are distinct. We 
could imagine that they are separated, then brought together; but motion is not a part of 
geometry. All that is left to distinguish them is our imagination. What makes them 
contiguous, then, is not their geometrical relation to each other (since, not being distinct in 
themselves, they can have no relation to each other), but how we choose to think of them or 
imagine them. 
 Julia Annas regards Mueller’s reading of Aristotle’s mathematical ontology as an 
“attractive, <…> a systematic and a well-thought-out account” (ibid), a “coherent scheme” 
of geometrical ontology (pg. 31). She criticizes it only on the grounds that it is not well-
supported by the text. I have argued on the contrary that, whatever its internal merits as an 
ontology, the geometrical ontology Mueller ascribes to Aristotle is not, in fact, coherent 
with Aristotle’s treatment of mathematical continuity and contiguity. 
Annas proposes a reading very similar to Mueller’s, though she understands 
Aristotelian abstraction somewhat differently. On her view abstraction is “(deliberate) lack 
of attention” (pg. 32), which, in the case of geometrical abstraction, seems to be inattention 
to all the sensible or non-geometrical features of a thing.28 Since she hesitates to ascribe to 
Aristotle Mueller’s subtle reading of “intelligible matter”, she argues that Aristotle’s 
abstractionism is vulnerable to the kind of objection Frege made to abstractionists in his 
own time; in particular, Annas’s Aristotle is vulnerable to a version of the Uniqueness 
Problem. Annas presents this version as being concerned with the impossibility of 
identifying any abstract object. Thus it is not quite the same as the difficulty which I 
emphasized before, the impossibility of there being more than one of each kind of 
mathematical object, but the difficulty ramifies. The problem, she says, quoting Frege, is 
that “we thus obtain from each object a something wholly deprived of content; but the 
 
28 Cf. Mueller pg. 160, where he argues that Aristotle thinks of mathematical abstraction as more 
than “eliminating something from consideration,” though it no doubt involves this. 





something obtained from one object is different from the something obtained from another 
object—though it is not easy to say how” (M & N, pg. 33).  
To see the difficulty for Aristotle on this view, suppose that the purportedly 
contiguous lines are abstracted from two contiguous bodies.  The bodies themselves were 
two in number, so one hopes that the objects abstracted from them, the lines, will also be 
two. On Annas’s reading, as on Mueller’s, Aristotle holds that geometrical abstraction 
produces a new object. As a result of the abstraction, one does not have the original object 
viewed in a certain way, but instead a new abstracted object. Yet if abstraction consists in 
ignoring every non-mathematical feature of the original body, the worry is that one will 
thereby separate the abstracted objects, even if only in thought, from any features which 
could distinguish them. Thus there seems to be no reason to take the supposedly contiguous 
two lines as being, in fact, two, apart from their history as the results of abstraction from 
two different bodies. Yet this is a feature of how we approach or grasp them, rather than a 
feature of the geometrical objects themselves. In other words, if this is the way Aristotle 
understands geometrical objects as abstractions, then he has no grounds for distinguishing 
contiguity from [relational] continuity, nor any coherent picture of the two kinds of 
continuity. 
Annas proposes that Aristotle’s view of geometrical objects is otherwise 
consistent29; it is just not a very good view, since it is prone to Fregean objections. I think 
she is correct about the problem such a view faces. But I think that because of this the view 
is also inconsistent with Aristotle’s treatment of continuity, for the reasons already stated. It 
cannot solve Aristotle’s puzzle, so that continuity and contiguity of the kind he defines is 
impossible given his ontology. If the view Annas describes is in fact Aristotle’s view, then 
he has erred doubly. Yet inconsistency is a charge not lightly to be laid against Aristotle, 
 
29 She does point out that Aristotle suggests that in arithmetic numerical properties are abstracted, 
while in geometry geometrical objects are abstracted (pg. 31-32). It is difficult to know what to 
make of this apparent inconsistency, unless one follows Mueller in thinking that the difference 
between properties and objects is not very important when it comes to the results of mathematical 
abstraction (Mueller, pg. 166). If Aristotle accepts a mathematical ontology such as Lear’s or 
Corkum’s, there is even more reason to think this; both discrete and [nonrelational]continuous 
magnitudes, i.e., numbers and geometricals, are properties strictly speaking, though a 
mathematician may be licensed to treat them as objects in the context of her study. 





and there are at least two ways of understanding Aristotle’s mathematical ontology which 
avoid attributing this inconsistency to him. To these I turn next. 
 
§6 Continuity and Aristotle’s mathematical ontology 
 
The two readings of Aristotle’s mathematical ontology offered by Jonathan Lear 
and Phil Corkum, respectively, share a common feature which offers to Aristotle a way to 
preserve his understanding of the two kinds of continuity. The common feature is that both 
emphasize the way in which geometrical objects are dependent beings, and clarify what this 
means for their status as abstractions. They both explain the way in which mathematical 
objects depend for their existence on the bodies from which they are abstracted so as to 
avoid the Fregean worry Annas presents. On both views, geometrical objects are dependent 
on physical bodies so that it is part of what they are to be dependent on some particular 
body; thus their identity as well as their existence is grounded in the object from which they 
are abstracted. Further, since for neither of these scholars does abstraction consist simply in 
inattention toward certain features of a body, the identity of a geometrical object is 
preserved.   
Both propose that, according to Aristotle, there is a sort of fictionalism involved in 
the way that mathematicians treat geometrical objects. According to Jonathan Lear, the 
fictionalism of Aristotle’s philosophy of math consists in the way in which one “filters” out 
non-mathematical properties of some body so as to treat it as being merely mathematical. 
Lear says the following: 
Generalizing, one might say that Aristotle is introducing an as-operator, or qua-operator, which 
works as follows. Let b be an Aristotelian substance and let "b qua F" signify that b is being 
considered as an F. Then a property is said to be true of b qua F if and only if b is an F and its 
having that property follows of necessity from its being an F:  
 G(b qua F) → F(b) & (F(x) - G(x)).  
Thus to use the qua-operator is to place ourselves behind a veil of ignorance: we allow ourselves to 
know only that b is F and then determine on the basis of that knowledge alone what other properties 
must hold of it. (pg. 168) 
Lear claims that “in geometry <…> one is really only considering an actual physical 
object in abstraction from its particular physical instantiation” (pg. 172). Lear thus 





understands abstraction according to the first way Mueller proposed, so that as a result of 
abstraction one takes one’s object to be the original thing on which the abstraction was 
performed, though considered in some particular respect. Still, a geometer accepts the 
fiction that there are pure geometrical objects, objects which are simply triangles, for 
example, and not triangular bodies, in order to focus on the properties the body has because 
it is triangular. According to Lear, geometry studies sensible magnitudes, but it attends to 
them only insofar as they have magnitude or are geometrical, not insofar as they are 
material, sensible, etc. Within the study of geometry one applies what Lear called a 
“predicate filter” (Lear, pg. 168 -169) to attend only to those properties which follow from 
the object being extended and shaped: 
Thus, for Aristotle, one can say truly that separable objects and mathematical objects exist, but all 
this statement amounts to – when properly analyzed – is that mathematical properties are truly 
instantiated in physical objects30 and, by applying a predicate filter, we can consider these objects 
as solely instantiating the appropriate properties. (Lear, pg. 170) 
Thus if we take Lear’s suggestion about how to understand Aristotle’s mathematical 
ontology, the bodies which we, as geometers, are examining mathematically are themselves 
distinct, so that their mathematical properties are differentiated by the bodies they belong 
to.31 If we begin our geometrizing with, for example, two figures X and Y, which are 
numerically two because they are instantiated in distinct bodies, nothing about our 
geometrical analysis of these should change the fact that they are two, that is, many and not 
one. Given Lear’s emphasis that the pure magnitudes really are just the sensible bodies, 
there is no reason to give up on the numerically distinct identities of the pure magnitudes 
arrived at by abstraction, even within the fiction. If you start off with two contiguous 
bodies, as a result of your abstraction you will thus have two solids, and thus two surfaces, 
and thus two contiguous lines. Thus the mathematical ontology which Lear finds in 
Aristotle is consistent with Aristotle’s account of continuity. 
According to Corkum, “in Aristotle’s view, the fiction of mathematics is not to treat 
what does not exist as if existing but to treat mathematical objects with an ontological 
 
30 Emphasis mine. 
31 Admittedly this touches upon the discussion of Aristotelian non-substantial particulars. Here I 
presuppose that non-substantial particulars are non-recurrent. For a recent defense of this position, 
see Wedin (2000), Erginel (2004), or Devereux (1992). 





status they lack” (“Aristotle on Mathematical Truth,” pg. 1061). On Lear’s reading, the 
interpreter might continue to use the expressions “pure magnitudes” and “sensible 
magnitudes”, with the proviso that there are not really any pure magnitudes; the do not 
exist, but are a fiction. On Corkum’s reading, there really are pure magnitudes, it is just that 
these are ontologically dependent beings. In ignoring what they depend on the geometer is 
thus engaging in a sort of fictionalizing, but it is not by pretending that there are pure 
magnitudes.  
As Corkum reads Aristotle, mathematical objects, the items I have been calling 
“pure magnitudes”, “possess their ontological status in virtue of standing in some relation 
to sensible substances” (pg. 1071), so that  “Aristotle holds that mathematics treats what 
exists qualifiedly as if it exists unqualifiedly” (pg. 1072). Thus, for example, a geometer 
might treat two lines as if they can stand alone, as if their status as existing, and as being 
the particular existent that they are, does not require any other being. In reality this is not 
the case; any particular line, for example, depends for its existence on the body whose 
surface it bounds. Now, while Corkum’s claim that for Aristotle mathematical objects are 
ontologically dependent is consistent with my proposal in this paper, the suggestion that in 
mathematics we treat mathematical objects as though they are independent seems to be in 
tension with it. How can we ground the numerical distinctness of our mathematical 
continua in the bodies they are properties of if we are treating them in mathematics as 
though they are not properties, that is, not ontologically dependent?   
The answer I have in mind is related to Aristotle’s methodological criticism of 
Parmenides in Physica I. In Physica I.2 Aristotle says that “to investigate whether what 
exists is one and motionless is not a contribution to the science of nature. For just as the 
geometer has nothing more to say to one who denies the principles of his science—this 
being a question for a different science or for one common to all—so a man investigating 
principles cannot argue in the way mentioned” (184b25-185a3). Aristotle’s subject in 
Physica I is the principles of natural science. By the end of Physica I it is clear that 
Aristotle takes change to be among the principles. This is partly explained by his claim in 
Physica II that the subject of natural science itself is what changes from an internal 
principle; it stands to reason that one must be able to make sense of change to make sense 
of changing things. In I.2 Aristotle seems to be criticizing Parmenides and Melissus for 





denying the subject of his current investigation; it does not help one investigating principles 
to deny that there are any, and doing so is no part of that investigation. For the same reason, 
I take it, denying or questioning the existence of the subject of any scientific investigation 
is no contribution to that science. In the case of the study of the principles of natural 
science, one cannot contribute to it by denying that there is such a thing as change.  In the 
case of natural science itself, one cannot contribute to it by questioning or denying the 
existence of the world of a multitude of changing things. A similar argument applies to the 
present question. If one starts off one’s investigation with two mathematical figures, 
ontologically dependent on two sensible bodies, it is no contribution to the inquiry into 
their mathematical properties and relations to deny that there are two.  If you start with two 
mathematical objects, having begun more fundamentally with two sensible objects, you 




In summary, the thought that coincident boundaries are numerically distinct because 
they are dependent bodies rather than spatially distinct helps to explain how it is that when 
two magnitudes are [relational] continuous with each other they form a [non-relational] 
continuum. When magnitudes are [relational] continuous their boundaries become one.  
When the boundaries become one there could be either only one point bounding both lines, 
or one point bounding only one line, or one bounding neither. It cannot be that one point 
bounds both lines, since points are individuated by the lines they bound. But it also cannot 
be the case that only one of the lines is bounded, since for Aristotle all lines are actually 
finite and bounded (there are no open line segments). But if the one point bounds neither 
line then it no longer marks an actual division between magnitudes. At best it marks a place 
where there could be a division – the point is only potential. When the boundaries of 
magnitudes become one in the way required, they disappear as actual boundaries, so that 
they, and the parts they delimit, are merely potential. Thus when two magnitudes are 
[relational] continuous, they form (potential) parts of a single continuous whole.32  
 
32 It is for this reason that I find Bostock’s claim (Bostock, pg. 183) that a continuuggm, according 
to Aristotle is “such that any two parts into which it is divided must share a limit” at best 





On my reading, the same distinction which holds for continuous and contiguous 
bodies holds also for continuous and contiguous mathematicals, or pure magnitudes. A 
continuous whole, whether a body or a purely geometrical item, is an undivided per se 
unity which has parts only potentially. Its parts, such as they are, are continuous with each 
other. They are such that their boundaries have become one, no longer actually but only 
potentially distinguishing them. Nevertheless, if the parts are made actual, the continuum 
being destroyed, the parts would be actually numerically distinct magnitudes, marked off 
from each other by their erstwhile shared boundary. Thus a continuum is such that when 
successive parts are actualized they bear toward each other the relation of contiguity.   
A mathematical ontology such as Lear or Corkum offers enables contiguous pure 
magnitudes such as lines, figures, and solids, to be distinct despite their coincident 
boundary points. If one begins with two bodies, one thus has two solids. Then, if one is 
focusing on just one side, one thus has two distinct figures despite their touching 
boundaries. And if one focuses on the boundaries where the figures coincide one will still 
have two lines. The lines are the boundaries of the figures, thus since the figures are 
numerically distinct, so, too, are their boundaries. Similarly, if one attends to the lines on 
the figures which touch at a point rather than along their length. Because the lines are parts 
of distinct figures, which are ultimately parts of distinct solids, which are finally 
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ambiguous. On my reading, as potential parts the spatial parts of a continuum do share a limit; but 
when they are parts in this way the continuum is not actually (yet) divided. To point out such parts 
is merely to show where the continuum could be divided. Once the continuum is divided, however, 
the parts do not share a boundary; they are merely contiguous, where this means that their 
boundaries touch without becoming one. Further, once the continuum is divided the magnitudes 
which result are no longer properly speaking parts of a continuum. 
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